and an increasing function of the return to crime, or the avoidance of costs arising from regulatory compliance. Compliance can therefore be increased either through more aggressive enforcement policies or by reducing the costs of complying with regulatory standards. Empirical tests for the relation of enforcement to compliance underlying OSHA (or other command and control regulatory systems similarly structured) require careful selection of an industry and specific regulatory standards and a method of systematically measuring compliance. This section describes the methodology for selecting an industry and standards in detail and the data employed in the empirical analysis.
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Further, these measures require estimating the costs of complying with all relevant OSHA standards. Thus, aggregate measures of violations can confound analyses of the relations between enforcement and compliance.
m The custom woodworking industry. Based on the criteria described above, this study uses a sample of establishments from the custom woodworking industry for evaluating OSHA performance. The custom woodworking industry is composed of firms producing wood cabinets, office fixtures, retail displays, and architectural (i.e., customized) cabinetry. The firms in this industry employ an average of 41 employees, although there are larger-scale establishments employing over 100 workers.
There are a number of advantages in selecting this industry. First, given the homogeneity of its product market, production technologies have a fairly high degree of similarity.3 This is important in terms of designating a set of key OSHA standards (see below) and in limiting variance across establishments in the estimated costs of complying with chosen standards. Nonetheless, the industry is representative of a broader class of manufacturing industries in that its production processes require the machining, refining, assembly, and finishing of an entire product.
A second desirable characteristic is that the industry has received a modest-and therefore typical-level of attention from OSHA since 1972. OSHA conducted a total of 594 inspections in the industry between 1972 and 1991. Since there are a total of 621 establishments in the industry sample (see below), about 5% of covered establishments in the sector receive some kind of inspection in a given year. This rate of inspection is slightly higher than the overall rate for establishments in manufacturing, where OSHA conducted 12,131 inspections of 378,000 eligible establishments in 1990
(or a rate of .032).4 Compliance behavior of establishments in this industry therefore provides information on how a typical manufacturing industry dominated by small establishments has adjusted to OSHA.5 A third advantage of using this industry for case study is the presence of a subset of OSHA standards that meet the requirements for standard selection described above: the safety standards related to machine-guarding and hand-held tools.6 Evaluating compliance with these standards has a number of advantages. First, the standards date back to the inception of OSHA and have not been significantly modified throughout its 25-year history. This means that establishments in the sample have faced consistent requirements throughout the study period. Second, the standards are clear and do not require sophisticated monitoring (in contrast to health standards such as wood dust or formaldehyde, which require complicated air sampling and laboratory follow up).
Third, the machine-guarding and hand-tool standards are subject to considerable scrutiny by OSHA inspectors. Based on the universe of inspections conducted from 1972 to 1991 in this industry, 43% of all violations cited are violations of these standards.
In a related vein, enforcement data indicate that OSHA inspectors examine compliance with these standards whether they are undertaking a safety or a health inspection. As a result, OSHA inspectors are both likely and able to accurately measure compliance levels during the course of most inspections.
Establishment compliance with machine-guarding and hand-tool standards is measured by counting the number of violations of these standards received at the time of an OSHA inspection to provide a measure of Vi,. Following equation (1), lishment is defined as in compliance with standards at time t if Vi, is less than V*.
Three definitions of compliance at t are employed, using V* = 0, 1, and 2. D Data. The study draws on the Integrated Management Information System (IMIS) maintained by OSHA to track its enforcement activity. The IMIS contains complete records of all inspections conducted by the agency for the period 1972-1991 for federally administered OSHA programs, and partial records (beginning in the mid-1980s) for state-administered programs. Each inspection record contains comprehensive information on characteristics of the inspected workplace (e.g., establishment and company size, location, union status); characteristics of OSHA inspection activity (such as length and physical coverage of the inspection); and detailed information on each violation of safety and health standard (severity, number of workers exposed).
To create a sample for study from the custom woodworking industry, a list of 621 establishments was compiled using information from the two main industry associations in the custom woodworking industry. In order to create a complete longitudinal sample going back to 1972, the search list includes only establishments located in states with federally administered OSHA programs. Based on this list, a search of the OSHA database identified a total of 250 establishments that had received one or more OSHA inspections.7 Data from the 250 inspected establishments are the basis of the following empirical analysis. For each establishment in the sample, a longitudinal file was created from the OSHA database, providing detailed histories of each inspection, which standards were violated, firm characteristics, and measures of inspection intensity and administrative status.
? Sample representativeness. Because IMIS data covers only establishments that have been inspected, the sample of establishments may not be representative of the universe if there is systematic bias in how OSHA selects plants for inspection. Alternatively, if establishments are initially chosen through random processes, the sample of inspected establishments should be representative of the industry from which they were drawn.
OSHA inspections are instigated by programmed activity (arising from planned inspection programs), employee complaints, follow-up efforts, and by accidents involving fatalities or serious injuries to several workers. Programmed inspections by OSHA arise from an administrative process that attempts to randomize inspections for all eligible establishments within an industry and geographic region (U.S. Department of Labor, 1994) . While 78% of all inspections in the sample were done on a programmed basis, 94% of first inspections arose from programmed activities. This suggests that the sample should be representative of the population of woodworking establishments.
7The OSHA IMIS database is organized on an inspection-level basis and does not include specific establishment-or firm-level identifiers. As a result, longitudinal samples must be assembled through matching procedures involving the use of multiple fields in the database (e.g., company name, address, location, SIC listing). The random nature of initial inspection probabilities can be further tested by comparing inspection probabilities between union and nonunion plants. Many industries exhibit stark union/nonunion differences in the causes and frequency of inspections arising from increased exercise of employee rights by union workers, such as the right to initiate OSHA inspections through employee complaints (Weil, 1991 (Weil, , 1992 to wood shapers, mortising equipment, and lathes, which can cost $1,500 per machine.
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Thus, capital-related compliance costs vary with the mix and number of saws, planers, joiners, boring equipment, power presses, and so forth that a manufacturer must either adapt or purchase in order to achieve compliance. These estimates reflect capital expenditures incurred by a typical woodworking firm, but do not include costs related to operator training, managerial time spent on interpreting and implementing OSHA requirements, or incremental costs associated with purchasing new or used equipment over time.
Given that the probability of a plant's being inspected over the entire study period is .4, and that the expected fine per inspection (in 1987 dollars) equals $300, and assuming for the moment that inspections in the industry are random events, equation (2) Since the estimated compliance costs dwarf this value of C*, one would predict low levels of compliance with machine-guarding and hand-tool standards in the sample. If the chance of inspections remains low, the above estimates also suggest little reason for compliance to improve, even given subsequent OSHA inspection activity. Table 2 Table 2 demonstrate a similar pattern of improving compliance given more "lax" definitions of compliance (i.e., where compliance is defined as having fewer than two or fewer than three violations of the standards). These results imply a high level of initial compliance (between 42% and 51%, depending on the definition of compliance). The table also demonstrates that compliance improves markedly as establishments receive subsequent inspections. Since internal factors related to compliance should be relatively constant between inspections, establishments appear to be responsive to external regulatory pressure in contrast to predicted behavior given observed pj, fj, and Cj. E Inspection probabilities. Observed compliance among custom woodworking shops shown in Table 2 does not necessarily mean that custom woodworking shops are acting counter to their profit-maximizing interest, however. A more careful analysis of the underlying probabilities of inspection is necessary in order to assess whether inspected establishments truly face the low chance of being inspected implied by the above analysis.
Once an establishment has been inspected by OSHA, the probability of inspection conceivably changes dramatically. If, for example, OSHA sought to ensure compliance among establishments that violated OSHA standards at the time of the first inspection, the probability of receiving a follow-up inspection would be close to 1.0. On the other hand, if OSHA does no follow up, the probability of subsequent inspections should be equal to initial inspection probabilities, with multiple inspections arising as a result of strictly random processes. A comparison between the observed distribution of inspections received per establishment and the expected number of inspections arising from a randomized inspection process demonstrates that the observed distribution arises from a nonrandom process.13 WEIL / 627 Of the 344 inspections with sequence number 2-10, 71 (20.6%) are listed officially as arising from OSHA follow-up efforts, 29 (8.4%) from employee complaints, and the remaining 244 (70.9%) from programmed inspections. Analysis of data on subsequent inspection probabilities, however, suggests that the majority of these inspections constitute de facto if not de jure follow-up inspections. If establishments receiving multiple inspections tend to have a higher number of OSHA violations in initial inspections, OSHA might be strategically choosing to conduct follow-up investigations on noncompliers more aggressively. This in turn implies that the probability of receiving an inspection given a violation of machine and handtool standards in a previous inspection is greater than the probability of receiving a subsequent inspection absent a violation in the previous inspection. Table 4 presents the conditional probability of receiving an inspection given previous inspection history. The results concerning second inspections show that inspection probabilities increase given violations in the first inspection. The probability of receiving a second inspection given a violation in inspection 1 was equal to .416
(column 2 in the table). In contrast, the probability of receiving a second inspection for an establishment having no previous violations of standards is equal to .136 (see column 3).
The pattern of conditional inspection probabilities is anomalous, however, for inspections subsequent to second-round inspections. Specifically, the probability of receiving a third inspection is lower for establishments having a violation in the second inspection (.239) than for establishments that did not violate OSHA standards in the second inspection (.399). This pattern continues in subsequent inspections, suggesting that inspectors tend to return to establishments for reasons other than affecting compliance behavior,14 or as the result of other agents triggering inspections.15 Nonetheless, Table 4 indicates that the conditional probability of receiving an inspection grows once one has been inspected for the first time. This is shown in column 4, which presents the probability of receiving an additional inspection, regardless of the number of violations previously cited.16
the maximum number of inspections/establishment received in the sample), by the total number of inspections. The x2 from comparing the observed and expected distributions far exceeds the value needed to reject the Ho that the two distributions arose from the same population.
14 Studies by Bardach and Kagan (1982) describe the existence of standard operating procedures and other bureaucratic patterns to explain this type of regulatory behavior (e.g., inspectors return to sites that are "easier" to inspect or where they face less hostility from employers, both of which may tend to have betterthan-average compliance). Just as the probability of receiving an inspection is conditional on previous enforcement activity, the expected fine per inspection changes according to the sequence number of the inspection, as shown in the final column of Table 4 bBaseline probability of receiving a first inspection during the 1972-1991 study period.
See text for discussion of this issue.
The conditional probabilities and mean penalties lagged by one inspection from Table 4 can be used in a decision framework where the establishment faces a sequence of choices on whether to comply or not comply and face the chance of an additional inspection and increasing penalties. Applying these estimates to a median plant facing a sequential decision-making problem18 leads to the same prediction of compliance behavior as found in the simpler analysis described above: the expected cost of not complying, risking detection, and facing penalties at the second and subsequent inspections are far lower than selecting voluntary compliance, even in the face of increasing conditional probabilities of follow-up inspections and growing penalty levels.19
One problem with using actual penalties received by plants in the sample is that these penalties understate the potential penalties faced by noncompliers-willful or repeat violations of cited standards can be subjected to OSHAs highest penalty levels.
In the period under study, these could amount to $10,000 for each violation.20 Applying 18 The decision problem is laid out as a sequence of compliance decisions alternating with a random chance of inspection given the conditional probabilities (Table 4) . The payoffs for different combinations of compliance choices and inspection occurrences are based on expected total penalties and, where appropriate, a cost of compliance of $5,000.
19 The prediction of noncompliance is made by "folding back" the decision tree from the final compliance decision following inspection 9 to the initial compliance decision previous to receiving any inspection.
A firm at the time of the initial compliance decision faces an expected cost of $733 from choosing noncompliance (arising from the lower expected cost of noncompliance in inspection rounds 2 through 9) versus $5,000 for choosing to comply immediately.
20 Occupational Safety and Health Act, Section 17(a). In addition, the act states, "Any employer who fails to correct a violation for which a citation has been issued ... within the period permitted for its correction ... may be assessed a civil penalty of not more than $1000 for each day during which such failure or violation continues" (Section 17(d)).
these far higher potential penalties to the sequential compliance decision leads to far higher likelihood of compliance at an early stage.21 Thus, if one takes into account increasing inspection probabilities and the possibility of steep penalties for noncompliance, the pattern of compliance found in Table 2 is more explicable, but requires that establishments assume far more draconian penalty policies than occur in practice.22
4. Modelling enforcement and compliance * Observed compliance with OSHA standards is a function of a number of factors other than inspection pressure. Equations (3a) and (3b) predict that compliance with standards by a firm will be determined by government pressure, the cost of compliance given production and work organization, and by other correlated factors that raise the costs of noncompliance, such as company size, multiplant status, and unionization. In addition, measures of compliance may be affected by the intensity of inspection activity itself, where more intensive inspections detect higher rates of violations (and therefore reduce the probability that an establishment will be found in compliance).
Given these potentially confounding factors, I constructed a model to predict establishment-level compliance given differing levels of OSHA inspection activity, establishment-and firm-level characteristics, and a series of controls for inspection intensity and administrative policies. In order to measure the independent impact of enforcement on compliance, a logit model can be used to predict compliance for plant 21 Specifically, assuming that a plant is initially assessed $300 for noncompliance in the first inspection, and that the penalty increases in $5,000 increments beyond the first inspection for continued noncompliance, a risk-neutral plant would be essentially indifferent between compliance and noncompliance at the second inspection and would choose compliance beyond the second inspection. (Sims, 1988; Smith, 1979) . Since OSHA also tends to place more emphasis on inspecting or reinspecting larger plants and multiplant firms, these characteristics must be explicitly controlled (Weil, 1991 (Weil, , 1992 . Union status is also controlled for because of its potential impacts on plant-level compliance behavior (Bacow, 1980) . and to control for establishment-level fixed effects (following Grey and Jones, (1991a)).
cl Empirical results. Table 5 presents the mean values and standard deviations of all variables and estimated coefficients and standard errors. In specifications la and 2a, an establishment was classified in compliance if there were no detected violations of machine-guarding and hand-tool standards (i.e., Vi, < 1), whereas in lb and 2b, an establishment was considered in compliance if it had one or fewer violations (Vi, < 2).
For each definition of compliance, results are also presented for two specifications, one including FOLLOW to control for the impact of explicitly designated follow-up inspections on compliance, and one without this variable.
The coefficients of greatest interest are those directly associated with enforcement: * Statistically significant at the 5% leve ** Statistically significant at the 1% level.
Note: Dependent variable in logit equals 1 if firm is in compliance with machine-guarding and hand-held tool standards at time of inspection, where: (la, 2a) compliance = 1 if Vi, < 1; (lb, 2b) compliance = 1 if Vi, < 2. Each specification also includes an intercept term. Standard errors are in parentheses.
If OSHA influences establishment behavior, the probability of compliance with key standards should increase with each additional inspection. Thus, while the initial level of measured compliance (at n = 1) reflects optimal internal allocations of capital and labor as well as the impact of OSHA pressure, Ap(K) = p(Kn+1) -p(Kn) represe a "clean" measure of the impact of additional OSHA inspections on compliance behavior. Table 6 uses logit coefficients from Table 5 to predict compliance given changes in the number of inspections received by establishments when all other variables are held constant at their mean levels. The impact of various factors on the probability of compliance given logit estimates from model la of Table 5 are presented in column 2
of Table 6 , while those using estimates from lb are shown in column 3 (which include a dummy variable for follow-up inspections). Table 6 demonstrates that the probability of compliance increases appreciably with initial OSHA inspection pressure (i.e., 8p(K)/8N > 0, where N is the inspection sequence number). At the time of the first inspection, the estimated probability of compliance is .19 under model la. Predicted compliance jumps to .67 under model la as a result of an additional inspection, holding other variables constant at their means and sizable compliance effects arising from second inspections exceed even those initially reported in Table 2 .
An additional inspection beyond the second inspection results in further, but much smaller increases among remaining establishments, with overall predicted compliance reaching .73. While the enforcement effect diminishes with each subsequent inspection (&2p(K)I&2N < 0), OSHA enforcement engenders continued responsiveness up to the point that the probability of compliance reaches .82 at the sixth inspection.
Estimated enforcement impacts on compliance are moderated when I include in the model a separate variable controlling for the presence of follow-up inspections (lb in Table 6 ). Model lb still finds striking predicted OSHA compliance effects, but they more closely reflect those actually observed in Table 2 than those found in the estimates generated by model la: It predicts a compliance probability at the time of the first inspection of .35, which then jumps to .66 at the time of the second inspection. Once again, the estimated compliance probabilities increase far less strikingly beyond the second inspection, rising from .71 in third inspections up to .83 at sixth inspections.
These results more closely parallel those found in Gray and Jones (199ib) , who find a similarly large impact of second inspections on the overall number of violations found in first OSHA inspections.27
Accumulated past penalties (LNPENAL) also have large and statistically significant impacts on current compliance behavior in all four models in Table 5 . The magnitude of these effects is large: increasing the accumulated penalties from the mean penalties given the second inspection to one standard deviation above the mean leads to a .09 increase in predicted compliance drawing on model 1 a, and a .05 increase using model lb. While accumulated past time in inspection (LNHOURS) is also positively related to compliance, its small size and lack of significance indicates that past enforcement time has little impact on compliance.28
The FOLLOW variables in models lb and 2b of Table 5 imply that the presence of an OSHA follow-up inspection has a major impact on compliance. Using the coefficient from model lb, Table 6 shows that an establishment receiving a second inspection that is not categorized by OSHA as a follow up has a .56 probability of being found in compliance, while predicted compliance is virtually 1.0 if that second inspection is designated as a follow up. This result must be interpreted with some caution.
Follow-up inspections are focused, primarily devoted to ensuring that specific violations found in previous inspections are corrected. Since they are far less likely to detect new violations than programmed inspections, the follow-up inspection compliance effect is potentially an artifact of this more cursory form of inspection (i.e., the follow-up compliance effect simply reflects that previously cited violations have been corrected).
However, in 46 cases in the sample, OSHA conducted a programmed inspection subsequent to a follow-up inspection. In 33 (72%) of these cases, plants were still found to have no violations of machine-guarding standards in these inspections, versus 13 cases where the inspection revealed violations. While not conclusive, this evidence implies that follow ups may have some effects on real compliance behavior beyond their direct impact on previously cited violations.
27 Gray and Jones draw on a similarly constructed longitudinal dataset for the manufacturing sector, but they use the total number of violations (rather than compliance with a specific standard) as their metric of compliance. Gray and Jones find that cited violations decrease by half from the 6.3 violations cited in first inspections in their sample. This represents an enforcement impact similar in magnitude to the doubling in compliance found here.
28 The inclusion of TOTINSP dummy variables as proxies for plant-level fixed effects increases the size and statistical significance of the INSP and INSP3+ coefficients. Gray and Jones (199 ib) show that including a variable like TOTINSP as a proxy for plant fixed effects does not bias the inspection sequence coefficients, although the coefficients of TOTINSP will be underestimated.
The estimated coefficients in Table 5 also predict that compliance is affected by organizational characteristics of the regulated establishments. Tables 5 and 6 imply highly responsive behavior, particularly between first and second inspections. There are a number of possible explanations for this degree of responsiveness.
First, as mentioned previously, compliance decisions may be made on the basis of potential, rather than actual, penalties. If plants believe that they will be levied with the maximum possible penalty arising from continuing noncompliance with standards, it becomes more economically rational to comply, even given relatively little scrutiny.
This explanation requires believing that plant managers have limited knowledge about actual OSHA penalty policies during the period. Alternatively, it could imply that managers are averse to even the small probability of facing very large penalties once a violation has been cited.
Second, one could explain the responsiveness if OSHA inspections provide firms with information on the benefits of compliance that they would not otherwise have (see Ashford (1976) for this "public good" justification of OSHA technical standards).
As a result of the inspection, firms are given information on how they can both comply with the law and reduce costs by improving safety and health practices. While this explanation may be plausible in complex and poorly understood safety or health standards, it seems unlikely that employers would not already perceive the potential benefits of machine-guarding standards.
Third, other organizational factors not included in the model may lead firms to become more responsive to OSHA, beyond the behavior predicted by simple models of profit maximization.30 The empirical estimates show that union status has a striking positive impact on compliance, as do establishment size and multiplant status to a lesser degree. Characteristics such as the presence of formal safety and health programs, policies, or committees; senior, middle, and lower-level management attitudes toward safety and health; or other aspects of organizational structure (e.g., degree of centralization, production policies, specific human resource practices) might explain some of the observed changes in compliance behavior (see for example GAO (1992) ).
29 It is interesting to note that the only significant year dummies are the positive coefficients observed during the Reagan administration (1981) (1982) (1983) (1984) (1985) (1986) (1987) . During this period, OSHA cut back on citation activity in general, thereby increasing the probability that a plant would be deemed in compliance with standards (hence the positive coefficients). These results are available from the author.
30 There is an extensive literature on the impact of organizational structure and culture on regulatory behavior. Rather than assume that compliance behavior results strictly from an economic benefit/cost calculus, this literature argues that characteristics of the firm itself will make it more or less receptive to external 
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Finally, citation of standard violations may raise the cost from continued noncompliance in other ways. For example, an industrial accident caused by the presence of a standard violation that has not been remediated by an employer may subject the employer to higher liabilities from litigation, workers compensation premiums, or the experience rating of insurers. Several of the woodworking firms surveyed on compliance costs noted that the passage of OSHA raised more general concerns about employer liability for workplace injuries. This suggests that the incentives for compliance with OSHA standards must be considered as part of a suite of larger regulatory pressures formed by workers compensation systems, private insurers, and the civil/criminal justice system (see Shavell (1984) for a discussion of optimal mixes of liability and safety regulation).
Conclusion
* The results in this article point to a strong link between OSHA enforcement and compliance, even in an industry that has been subjected to relatively modest albeit typical pressure. This evidence bolsters the findings of earlier studies by Bartel and Thomas (1985) and Gray and Jones (1991a, 1991b) by demonstrating large compliance effects even if one focuses on a specific industry and subset of safety standards.
The impact of OSHA on compliance, however, leads to a more fundamental question about OSHA policy: Does the increased compliance lead to better safety outcomes?
The OSHA IMIS data cannot directly provide an answer to this question, since they do not include establishment injury rates. Examining injury rates for two SIC industries (SIC 243 and 2431) closely related to custom woodworking can provide some insights into this question. lost-work-day injury rates (i.e., those injuries leading to at least one day lost from work). In contrast to the overall rates presented in Figure 1 , lost-work-day rates have not changed appreciably over the period under study.33
Taken together, these results may indicate that compliance with machine standards have reduced less-serious injuries but have not appreciably affected more-serious causes of injuries. Alternatively, the annual results may indicate that there is limited spillover of OSHA enforcement on the majority of establishments that have not been subjected to OSHA enforcement. Thus the benefits of compliance are limited to those establishments (40% of the universe in this study) that actually received some scrutiny by OSHA.
The highly responsive behaviors documented in this study suggest that OSHA can be successful in changing employer behavior. The results in Figures 1 and 2 , however, strongly suggest that policy-makers must craft standards carefully to ensure that this compliance ultimately leads to desired safety and health outcomes. Further study requires connecting compliance with specific standards directly to injury or illness outcomes: higher compliance may mean little if standards do not result in desired safety or health outcomes.
31 The OSHA dataset does not include information on injury rates for inspected establishments. Compliance behavior cannot therefore be directly linked to injury performance.
32 The positive links between enforcement to compliance and compliance to injury rates provide a vehicle to explain enforcement/injury linkages as documented in studies by Cooke and Gautschi (1981) and more recently Gray and Scholz (1990) , which show strong impacts of OSHA inspections on injury rates.
33 In contrast, these results indicating a possible breakdown between OSHA standards and injury outcomes are more consistent with the classic studies of OSHA performance conducted by Viscusi (1979 Viscusi ( , 1986 and by Ruser and Smith (1991) .
